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Vl 
Pursuant to Utah Rule of Appellate Procedure 24, Appellant Jeffrey Larson 
respectfully submits this Reply Brief in support of his appeal from the May 19, 2015, 
Order of the trial court granting Alterra a preliminary injunction, R. 580-573. 
ARGUMENT 
Mr. Larson showed in his opening brief that the trial court erred in granting a 
preliminary injunction, an "extraordinary," "equitable" remedy, not "lightly granted." 
System Concepts, Inc. v. Dixon, 669 P.2d 421, 425 (Utah 1983). Alterra provides nothing 
to genuinely refute that the trial court erred. 
I. Mr. Larson Is Appealing the Trial Court's Legal Conclusions. 
In his opening brief, Mr. Larson demonstrated that he is appealing the trial court's 
numerous legal errors, culminating in its erroneous conclusion that Alterra was entitled to 
the "extraordinary remedy" of a preliminary injunction. Alterra cannot really dispute that 
ll the trial court made repeated legal errors. So it argues that Mr. Larson is actually 
appealing the trial court's finding of facts. (Appellee Br. at 1, 23.) Relatedly, Alterra 
repeatedly asserts that Mr. Larson failed to marshal the evidence supporting the trial 
court's findings of facts, and his appeal should therefore be dismissed. 1 Alterra is wrong. 
Mr. Larson is challenging the trial court's legal conclusion that Alterra was entitled to the 
"extraordinary remedy" of a preliminary injunction, which itself was the culmination of 
the numerous other legal errors. 
1 Appellee's Br. at 18, 19, 20, 22-23, 29, 42, 44, 48, 49. Alterra's Statement of 
Facts is paragraph after paragraph of testimony from Alterra's witnesses that it contends 
supports the Order. (Id. at 5-10, ,r,r 1-23; at 12-16, ,r,r 27-52, 54.) 
1 
To briefly recap, In August 2014, Mr. Larson signed an integrated Regional Sales 
Manager/ Direct Seller Agreement ( the "2015 Agreement,") (R.1 ), drafted by Alterra, a 
pest-control company. The 2015 Agreement constituted the tenns of service Mr. Larson 
was to provide for Alterra's 2015 summer sales program, which ran from April to August 
2015. Although Mr. Larson was responsible for recruiting for Alterra's 2015 summer 'il 
sales program beginning in the fall of 2014, he was only to be compensated based on the 
sales by him and those in his "downline" during the summer of 2015. The parties 
modified the 2015 Agreement's definition of "Confidential Information" in a "December 
2014 Addendum," also drafted by Alterra. (R.652.) In January 2015, after Mr. Larson 
recruited for Alterra for months for the summer of 2015 without compensation, he left to 
accept employment with a company that sells security services. Alterra immediately 
sued for inter alia breach of the 2015 Agreement of misappropriation of trade secrets 
under the Unifonn Trade Secrets Act (the "UTSA"), Utah Code sections 13-24-1 to -9. (t 
The trial issued the preliminary injunction in February, ruling that Alterra was entitled to 
the injunction under both theories. 
In particular, Mr. Larson is appealing (i) the trial court's interpretation of the 2015 
Agreement, as modified by the December 2014 Addendum; and (ii) the trial court's 
interpretation of the UTSA. Both are legal questions.2 As Alterra acknowledges, 
marshalling the evidence is only required when a party is challenging factual findings. 
2Desert Power, LP v. Public Service Com,m 'n, 2007 UT App 374, ,r 12, 173 P.3d 
218 ("An 'interpretation of a contract presents a question oflaw[.]" (Green River Canal 
Co. v. Thayn, 2003 UT 50, iJ 16, 84 P.3d 1134); LP/ Serv. v. Labor Comm 'n, 2007 UT 
App 375, ,r 7, 173 P.3d 858 ("Question of statutory construction are matters oflaw ... "). 
2 
(Appellee's Br. at 22.) Appellate courts defer to trial courts on findings of fact if the trial 
court uses the appropriate legal standard, because the finder of fact can evaluate the 
credibility of witnesses, which a written transcript alone cannot reveal.3 But if a trial 
court misapplies the law to the facts, there is no such deference, and the trial court's legal 
~ conclusions are reviewed de novo.4 
Even if Alterra were correct that Mr. Larson is appealing the trial court's factual 
findings, the standard of review would not be, as Alterra suggests, the same abuse of 
discretion standard applied after a full trial on the merits. Preliminary injunctions are 
court orders barring defendants from doing something they would otherwise be legally 
entitled to do, which is why a preliminary injunction is an extraordinary, equitable 
remedy. Consequently, a trial court's "discretion must be exercised consiste11tly witlt 
sou11d equitable principles, 'taking into account all tlte facts and circumstances of tlte 
case'."5 Alterra's preliminary injunction interferes with Mr. Larson's fundamental right 
3 E.g., Brown v. Babbitt, 2015 UT App 161, 116-7, 353 P.3d 1262 (fact finder's 
role is to assess credibility and weigh evidence). 
4 E.g., State v. Barela, 2015 UT 22, 1 17, 349 P.3d 676, 680, reh 'g denied (May 
21, 2015) ("We ... yield[] deference to the jury's determination of the sufficiency of the 
evidence but address[] the legal questions ... de novo.") (footnotes omitted)); Desert 
Power, LP, 2007 UT App 374, 1 12 ('"[W]hen reviewing an application or interpretation 
of law[,] we use a correction of error standard, giving no deference to [the trial court's] 
interpretation[.]" (quoting Anderson v. Public Serv. Conun 'n, 839 P.2d 822, 824 (Utah 
1992)). 
5 Kasco Servs. C01p. v. Benson, 831 P .2d 86, 90 (Utah 1992) ( citations omitted; 
emphasis added). 
3 
to earn a living, 6 by barring him from recruiting people he knows, by all accounts the 
most effective method for recruiting door-to-door salespeople. (R.813, Feb 11, 2015, 
Hr'g, 42:18-43:3.) Mr. Larson's appeal is on legal grounds, but the trial court's 
interpretation of the 2015 Agreement and UTSA suggests that it failed to properly 
consider the equitable considerations arising from interfering with Mr. Larson's 
livelihood. 
II. The Trial Court Erred in Granting the Iniunction. 
A. Likelihood of Success. 
Under Utah Rule of Civil Procedure 65A( e )( 4 ), a plaintiff seeking a preliminary 
injunction must show "a substantial likelihood that [it] will prevail on the merits ... , or 
the case presents serious issues on the merits." To make the "likelihood" showing 
requires "a prima facie showing that the elements of its underlying claim can be 
proved."7 However, the trial court was unaware of the "prima facie" test (Appellant's Br. • 
at 19 (citing R.814, Feb 12, 2015, Hr'g, 160:16-19), and thus did not apply it. That was 
error. 
6 Utah Code § 34-34-2 (Utah public policy is that "the right to live includes 
the right to work"). 
7 Water & Energy Systs. Tech., Inc. v. Keil, 1999 UT 16, ,r,r 8-15, 974 P.2d 821 
(Utah 1999) (reversing grant of preliminary injunction on trade secrets claim where 
plaintiff did not make prima facie case)); see also, e.g., 43A C.J.S. Injunctions § 55 
(updated 2015) (petitioner for preliminary injunction must make a prima facie case). 
Tellingly, Alterra utterly ignores the ''prima facie" test. 
4 
i. Alterra Cannot Meet the "Prima Facie" Test on Its Breach of 
Contract Claim. 
Alterra cannot meet the "prima facie" on its breach of contract claim for the 
following reasons: 
1. Alterra only barred Mr. Larson from recruiting Alterra's indepe11de1tt 
contractors for a compa11y tltat ''provide[sf services of tlte type offered by Alterra," i.e., 
pest-control services, in subparagraplt 13(ii) of tlte 2015 Agreement. The trial court 
~ recognized it had the responsibility to interpret the 2015 Agreement, including 
subparagraph 13(ii). 8 A court enforces an unambiguous contract "according to its terms." 
Brodkin v. Tuhaye Golf, LLC, 2015 UT App 165, ,I 18, 355 P.3d 224. The trial court did 
not find the term "services of the type offered by Alterra" ambiguous; it simply ignored 
it. The trial court thus failed to follow the fundamental precept that in interpreting 
contracts, all provisions must be considered, with none ignored.9 Mr. Larson's employer 
sells security services, not pest-control services like Alterra. (Appellee's Br. at 5, ,r 1.) 
Therefore, the trial court erred in concluding Mr. Larson 1s barred from recruiting 
~ Alterra's contractor salespeople to work for his new company. 
Alterra acknowledges that courts must give effect to all terms. (Id. at 24-25.) Yet, 
tellingly, other than quoting the "services of the type" language, Alterra (similar to the 
trial court) otherwise ignores it. (Appellee's Br. at 11, 26.) The trial court did not find 
8 R.813, Tr. Day 1 156:22-25.); Desert Power, LP, 2007 UT App 374, at ,r 12 
(contract interpretation is a question oflaw). 
9 E & H Land, Ltd. v. Farmington City, 2014 UT App 237, ,I 13, 336 P.3d 1077 
(citation omitted), quoted in Appellee's Br. at 24-25. 
5 
Alterra's "services of the type" language ambiguous, but Alterra hints several times that 
it may be. IO But Alterra's suggestions that subparagraph 13(ii) may be ambiguous are 
insufficient. Alterra would have to offer a reasonable interpretation-but cannot-that 
the language barring Mr. Larson from recruiting Alterra independent contractors to sell 
for a company that "provide[ s] services of the type offered by Alterra" bars him from 
recruiting for a company that sells security systems. 
Additionally, Alterra argues that the trial court did not improperly rely on 
Alterra's parol evidence in interpreting the 2015 Agreement, including the "services of 
the type offered by Alterra" provision. (Appellee's Br. at 28.) But the trial court did rely 
on such testimony. For example, the trial court "found" in paragraph 23 of the Order that 
"Plaintiff ltas goodwill between it and its c/ie11ts[,J wlticlt c/ie11ts include not only fits] 
customers ... , but fits] independent contractors." (R.577-76 ~ 23 (emphasis added). 11 ) 
Even if Alterra's "goodwill" with its salespeople were protectable (see § II.A.i.3.b ), • 
nothing in the 2015 Agreement supports the trial court's legal conclusion that Alterra's 
IO Appellee's Br. at 25 ("Provisions which may seem ambiguous can become clear 
when 'considered in the context of the entire document."'); at 27 ("Even if there is some 
ambiguity, Alterra has [met the likelihood prong]"); at 28 ("Thus, if there is ambiguity, 
the evidence supports the district court's conclusion .... "). 
11 Similarly, paragraph 5 of the Order states: "The parties ... subsequently 
exchanged services for money [under the 2015 Agreement]." Mr. Larson disputes that he 
received anything for the recruiting he did for Alterra in the fall of 2014, so the trial court 
must have relied on Alterra's witnesses. (R.579.) 
6 
contractor-salespeople are its "clients." Instead, the trial court improperly relied on 
testimony from Alterra's witnesses, which was plain error. 12 
2. Alterra Modified the 2015 Agreement's Definition of Co11jide11tial 
Information in tlte December 2014 Addendum. Alterra modified the definition of 
~ "confidential infonnation" in the 2015 Agreement, signed by the parties in August 2014, 
when the parties signed the December 2014 Addendum. (Appellant's Br. at 22-24.) In 
particular, Alterra narrowed the definition of "confidential infonnation" by changing the 
terms to omit the identity and contact information of Alterra's independent contractor 
salespeople. (Cf R.652 ,r 1 with R.2 1 14.) Alterra also narrowed the 2015 Agreement 
by providing that infonnation Mr. Larson already knew in December 2014, that is in the 
public domain, or he received from a third party who was free to disclose it is not 
confidential. (R.652 ,r 2.) It is black-letter law that language in a new agreement benveen 
i) parties, including a modification, supersedes contrary language in an earlier agreement. 13 
Alterra argues Mr. Larson inadequately briefed modification. (Appellee's Br. at 
29-30.) But while Alterra asserts in one breath that Mr. Larson provided no legal 
authority regarding modification, it acknowledges in the next that he did. (Id.) Alterra 
also baldly asserts that Mr. Larson "provides no contractual provision that was 
12 E & H Land, Ltd., 2014 UT App 237, at ,r,r 12-13, cert. denied sub n01n. E & H 
v. Farmington (Utah Feb. 11, 2015) (parol evidence of a party's intent is only admissible 
if the contract is facially ambiguous or has a latent ambiguity.) Alterra does not argue 
facial or latent ambiguity. 
13 Appellant's Br. at 22-24 & n.8 (citing Harris v. JES Assocs., Inc., 2003 UT App 
112, ,r 46, 69 P.3d 297; Rapp v. Mountain States Tel. & Tel. Co., 606 P.2d 1189, 1191 
(Utah 1980); Wardv. IHC Health Servs., Inc., 2007 UT App 362, ,r 8, 173 P.3d 186). 
7 
supposedly modified or superseded." (Id.) Yet Mr. Larson has provided the provision: 
In the December 2014 Addendum, Alterra modified the definition of "confidential 
information" in paragraph 14 of the 2015 Agreement, both as to what is and what is 11ot 
confidential infonnation. (Appellant's Br. at 22-24.) 
In sum, Alterra cannot dispute its definition of "Confidential Information" in the 
December 2014 Addendum is substantively different in certain key ways from its 
definition in the 2015 Agreement. It also cannot dispute the parties signed the December 
2014 Addendum months after they signed the 2015 Agreement. Consequently, Alterra 
wants this Court, like the trial court, to disregard that Alterra modified the definition of 
"confidential infonnation" in the 2015 Agreement in December 2014. 14 This Court, 
however, should not ignore the trial court's error. 
3. The Trial Court Erred in Analyzing tlte U11e11forceahle Restrictive 
Covenants in the 2015 Agreement. Alterra's restrictive covenants are unenforceable 
restrictions on competition and the right to earn a living. Utah public policy "favors free 
competition," and therefore all "covenants restricting competition are disfavored." 
Cordell v. Berger, No. 2:0l-CV-71 OC, 2001 WL 1516742,*5 (D. Utah Nov. 27, 2001). 
Accordingly, "restrictive cove11a11ts are not favored in the law and are strictly construed 
14 Alterra contends that the 2015 Agreement and December 2014 Addendum are 
not referring to the same type of infonnation. (Appellee's Br. at 33-34.) But both 
documents reference such things as training materials and products. Furthennore, Alterra 
provided in paragraph 2 of the December 2014 Addendum that certain infonnation it 
defined in the 2014 Agreement as confidential was not confidential under the December 
2014 Addendum, signed months later. There is no reasonable interpretation of the two 
agreements whereby infonnatio.n Alterra agreed in December 2014 is not confidential is 
nevertheless now confidential, because the parties had earlier agreed it was. 
8 
in favor of tlte free and unrestricted use of p1·operty." St. Benedict's Dev. Co. v. St. 
Benedict's Hosp., 811 P .2d 194, 198 (Utah 1991) ( emphasis added). In particular, 
restrictive covenants "primarily designed to limit competition or restrain the rigltt to 
engage in a common calling," suclt as a sales person, "are not enforceable." Robbins 
Ci) v. Findlay, 645 P .2d 623, 627 (Utah 1982) ( emphasis added). 15 Applying that rule here, 
the restrictive covenants in the 2015 Agreement are unenforceable: 
a. The trial court erred wlten it rewrote tlte 2015 Agreement to include the 
term "clients." The trial court erred when it concluded that Alterra has "goodwill" with 
its independent contractor salespeople. (R.577-76 , 23.) The trial court rewrote the 
unambiguous language of subparagraphs 13(i), regarding soliciting Alterra customers, 
and 13(ii), regarding soliciting its contractor salespeople, of the 2015 Agreement to 
include "clients," a tenn not in the 2015 Agreement. If Alterra wanted subparagraphs 
• 13(i) and 13(ii) to mirror each other regarding what Mr. Larson is barred from doing in 
his common calling, it should have drafted them to reflect that. It was not the trial court's 
place to do so: [A] court may not make a better contract for the parties than they have 
made for themselves; furthennore, a court may not enforce asserted rights not supported 
by the contract itself. Ted R. Brown and Assocs. v. Carnes Corp., 753 P.2d 964, 970 
15 See also Lazer Inc. v. Kesselring, 823 N.Y.S.2d 834, 839 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 2005) 
(holding restrictive covenant barring former employee from soliciting fonner co-
employees unenforceable, because the purpose was not to protect employer from unfair 
competition); Nat'! Employnient Serv. Corp. v. Olsten Staffing Serv., Inc., 761 A.2d 401, 
(i) 405 (N.H. 2000) ("the mere cost associated with recruiting and hiring employees is not a 
legitimate interest protectable by a restrictive covenant in an employment contract"). 
9 
(Utah Ct. App.1988). That is especially true here, where the disfavored restrictive 
covenants are construed against Alterra. 
Alterra puzzlingly argues that Mr. Larson "accuse[s]" the trial court of rewriting 
the 2015 Agreement to include "clients" "without identifying where in the 2015 
Agreement the district court supposedly made this change." (Appellee's Br. at 39.) To 
repeat: The trial court rewrote paragraph 13 to add "clients." The trial court seemingly 
wanted to enjoin Mr. Larson from recruiting Alterra contractors for any company that 
sells its services using door-to-door sales people, despite subparagraph 13(ii). But, again, 
a court may not rewrite an agreement because one party does not like the terms it agreed 
to. 
b. Tlte trial court also erred in concluding that Alterra ltas legally 
protectable goodwill with its independent contractors. Utah law is clear: The only 
-interest that a business may protect in disfavored restrictive covenants is its goodwill with 
its customers: 
Goodwill is the advantage ... acquired by an establishment, beyond tlte 
mere value of the capital, stocks, funds or property employed therein, in 
consequence of the general patronage . . . it receives from . . . habitual 
customers on account of its location, or local position or reputation for 
quality, skill, integrity or punctuality ... It is the probability that old 
customers will resort to the old place or seek old friends, and the likelihood 
of new customers being attracted to well advertised and favorably known 
services or goods. 16 
16 Peterson v. Jackson, 2011 UT App 113, ,r 35, 253 P.3d 1096 (quoting Jackson 
v. Caldwell, 415 P.2d 667, 670 (Utah 1966)); see also TruGreen Companies, LLC v. 
Mower Bros., Inc., 2008 UT 81, ,r 11, 199 P.3d 929 (restrictive covenants interfering with 
a person's right to make a living are enforceable only if "necessary to protect ... good 
will"); Allen v. Rose Park Pharmacy, 237 P.2d 823, 827-28 (Utah 1951) (holding a 
10 
~ Alterra' s independent contractor salespeople are just that, people who sell for it, not 
customers it sells to. Alterra argues that the cases Mr. Larson cited do not state that the 
legal definition of "goodwill" does not exclude a company's relationship with its 
ti salespeople. (Appellee's Br. at 39 n.10.) But when something is defined by what it is-
here, "goodwill" is defined as an asset related to customers-there is no need to also say 
what it is not. 17 
Alterra also argues that courts have found that a party's relationships with its 
independent contractors are a protectable interest, even if it is not called "goodwill." (Id. 
at 36-37.) However, Alterra cites no Utah cases in support, because there are none. The 
only federal case Alterra cites in which it appears that the court might have applied Utah 
law is Neways Inc. v. Mower, 543 F. Supp. 2d 1277 (D. Utah 2008). But the court there 
@) did not state it was applying Utah law and cited no law from any state. Furthennore, 
whether the restrictive covenant there improperly interfered with the right to earn a living 
by recruiting salespeople was not the issue. 
According to Alterra, the Neways court "enforc[ ed] a non-solicitation provision 
that prohibited soliciting current independent contractors." (Appellee's Br. at 36 (citing 
Neways, 543 F. Supp. 2d at 1287-88).) Alterra also asserts that the "non-solicitation 
provision in Neways ... did not prohibit the defendants from soliciting distributors in 
covenant not to compete is necessary for the protection of the goodwill of the business if 
the signer is likely to take customers from the employer if the signer leaves). 
17 Alterra cites evidence it argues supports the trial court's finding that Alterra has 
a protectable interest. (Appellee's Br. at 37.) But Alterra misses the point: Mr. Larson is 
appealing the trial court's legal conclusion that Alterra could have a protectable interest. 
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their frontlines [i.e., from among those the defendants personally recruited and the 
defendants' immediate families], but the Court did not hold that this fact was 
detenninative." (Id. at 36 n.7.) 
Alterra does not quite accurately describe Neways, where two separate agreements 
were at issue. One provided the signer was "not prohibited from recruiting his or her 
'personally enrolled downline Distributors [ of the plaintiff] and immediate family 
members."' 543 F. Supp. 2d at 1286. The other provided the signer would not recruit 
"any distributor" of the plaintiffs, with no exception for the signer's own recruits and 
family members Id. at 1288 ( emphasis added). But the issue before the court on botlt 
agreements was whether to issue an injunction against the defendants-regardless of 
which agreement they signed-barring them from soliciting plaintiffs contractors they 
either did not recruit personally or who were not family members. Id. at 1282, 1284 (the 
plaintiff "recognize[ d] that the [defendants] were entitled to recruit their immediate 
family members, as well as those distributors whom they had personally sponsored into 
plaintiff'). 
In other words, in Neways, the issue was whether a multi-level marketing 
company that essentially provided a downline to certain contractors could protect itself 
contractually from those contractors later recruiting that downline for another company. 
But those contractors were not barred from soliciting their own recruits and family 
members for another company. Here, Mr. Larson is enjoined from recruiting individuals 
he was personally responsible for recruiting, the very types of people excluded from the 
Neways injunction. Even if Neways controlled, nothing in it suggests that in Utah 
12 
anything other than goodwill with customers may be protected by a disfavored restrictive 
covenant. 18 
c. A covenant not to solicit is analyzed the same as a covenant not to 
compete, and, furthermore, paragraph 13 of the 2015 Agreement is a covenant not to 
compete. The trial court erred in concluding, with no explanation, that this case is a non-
solicitation case and therefore is somehow inherently "different" from a non-compete 
case. (R.578 1 16.) The trial court cited TruGreen Cos. v. Mower Bros., but the court 
made no such distinction there. 2008 UT 81, 1 11, 199 P .3d 929 ("covenants not to 
compete ... , disclose private infonnation, or solicit the employer's customers ... are 
enforceable [if] ... necessary to protect a company's good will" (emphasis added)). 
Alterra argues, based on Neways and cases from other states, that the trial court 
was correct that covenants not to compete and covenants not to solicit are fundamentally 
different. (Appellee's Br. at 38-39.) But Neways (even if the court applied Utah law) is 
not controlling and readily distinguishable in any event. Moreover, states vary greatly in 
how they treat restrictive covenants that restrict competition. (See n.19.) Utah public 
policy is clear, however: All such restrictive covenants are disfavored and construed 
against the drafter, including covenants not to solicit. 
Furthennore, even if the distinction between a covenant not to compete and a 
covenant not to solicit might have merit-and it does not under TruGreen-it would be 
18 Alterra cites cases from other jurisdictions, but rules regarding restrictive 
covenants that interfere with the right to make a living vary greatly by state. See, e.g., 
Brian Malsberger, Covenants Not to Compete: A State-by-State Survey (9th ed. 2013). In 
Utah, the only legally protectable interest when restrictive covenants that interfere with 
the right to make a living are at stake is goodwill with customers. 
13 
irrelevant. Alterra argues that it is only attempting to enforce a non-solicit provision, not 
a non-compete. (Appellee's Br. at 38-39.) But Alterra made clear at the hearing that 'i 
although it referred only subparagraph 13(ii) in its Complaint, its breach of contract claim 
is actually based on all of paragraph 13. (Appellant's Br. at 21-22.) But Alterra plainly 
stated in paragraph 13 tltat it is a covenant ,wt to compete: 
It is the intent of the parties that this Non-Solicitation & Covenant not to 
Compete Agreement wrecludes Representatives from interfering in Alterra's 
business in any way. 1 
Based on Alterra's argument that paragraph 13 must be read in its entirety, the trial court 
relied on subparagraph 13(i) and paragraph 13 generally no less than five times in the 
Order.20 That includes in paragraph 14 of the Order (R.578), where the trial court 
concluded that the "express intent between the parties in paragraph 13 of the Agreement 
[is] that Defendant may not interfere with Alterra's business in any way." 
In other words, the trial court read around Alterra's plain statement in 
paragraph 13 of tlte 2015 Agreement tltat paragraplt 13 is a covenant not to compete, 
even while it relied on the rest of the same sentence in granting Alterra its injunction. 
That was plain error. 21 
19 Alterra argues that paragraph 13 is not a covenant not to compete, because that 
term is in the heading of paragraph 13, and is only for convenience. (Appellee's Br. at 
38.) But Alterra stated in the body of paragraph 13 that it is a covenant not to compete. 
20 Paragraphs 2, 9, 10, 14, and 29 of the Order all reference either subparagraph 
13(i) or paragraph 13 generally, or both. (R.579-577, 575 (quoted in Appellant's Br. at 4-
6).) 
21 Appellee's Br. at 28 n.5. Alterra also argues that subparagraph 13(i) is not a 
non-compete provision, because it does not include the term "non-compete." That is 
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d. The Court should hold that the trial court erred i11 "blue-penciling" the 
overbroad term "future contractors" from paragraph 13 of tlte 2015 Agreement. The 
trial court improperly "blue-penciled" the disfavored restrictive covenants-Le., rewrote 
them-by deleting the facially overbroad provision in paragraph 13 that Mr. Larson may 
not recruit Alterra's "future contractors." (Appellant's Br. at 29-32.) The trial court 
recognized that "future contractors" is facially overbroad, both because logically anyone 
is a potential Alterra contractor, and because Mr. Larson would essentially be barred 
from "recruiting returned missionaries, for example, and the Court believes that that 
would be too broad of a restriction on Defendant." (R.574 ,r 33.) But the trial court did 
not simply void the facially overbroad restrictive covenants, it wrote "future contractors" 
out of subparagraph l 3(ii) when it granted Alterra' s injunction. 
No Utah case has explicitly held that a court may not blue-pencil a facially-
overbroad restrictive covenant that interferes with a person's right to make a living. But 
if the Court were to allow such blue-penciling, it would severely undermine the policy 
disfavoring such covenants.22 The trial court rewrote what it recognized was facially 
overbroad Alterra's restrictive covenant by deleting "future contractors" because it 
irrelevant, because it is part of paragraph 13, which is a covenant not to compete. 
Furthermore, paragraph 13(i) is in part a covenant not to compete: "Representative will 
not ... [i]nduce or attempt to induce, solicit or attempt to solicit ... any then current 
customer of Alterra to . . . contract with another summer sales company." (R.2.) A 
covenant not to solicit customers is a covenant not to compete for customers. 
22 While Mr. Larson's discussion in the text is in the context of disfavored 
restrictive covenants, blue-penciling would also be contrary to the general rule that courts 
may not rewrite contracts. Ted R. Brown, 153 P.2d at 970. 
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concluded that was not "what the parties would have intended." (Id.) But the reason 
restrictive covenants that interfere with the right to make a living are disfavored is that 
there is no intent of the "parties." Companies like Alterra draft such covenants solely for 
their own benefit. They then hold such covenants like a club over the head of the signers. 
Just a threat to sue by the company will scare most signers into complying with an 
overbroad restrictive covenant. Furthennore, signers who might not be cowed still run 
head-long into the reality that being sued is expensive, even if a defendant ultimately 
"wins." 
Consequently, the Alterras of the world know there is very little risk from drafting 
overbroad disfavored restrictive covenants, because they will seldom be scrutinized by a 
court. As a practical matter, they thus have very little incentive to draft such covenants 
carefully. And that creates a vicious circle-the Alterras of the world can make the risk 
to signers seem so great that they dare not fight, even if the restrictive covenants are 
clearly overbroad, like the trial court concluded Alterra' s are. As a result, cases like the 
present one are rare, so rare that it has been decades since System Concepts, Inc. v. Dixon, 
669 P.2d 421 (Utah 1983), on which both parties rely. In the meantime, a company like 
Alterra' s only concern when drafting an overbroad disfavored restrictive covenant is 
that-in the unlikely event such a covenant should receive judicial scrutiny-a court 
would rule the entire covenant unenforceable. 
If the Alterras of the world knew that a court would "fix" their overreaching by 
blue-penciling, they would have virtually no incentive not to draft even more overbroad 
restrictive covenants. Such companies would be even less likely to see their disfavored 
16 
• 
restrictive covenants reviewed by a court: More facially overbroad restrictive covenants 
would scare the relatively unsophisticated signers even more. In addition, the few signers 
who might be willing to test such covenants would have to assess the risk from a partial 
"victory" if a court rewrites an overbroad restrictive covenant, rather than voiding it. 
In other words, if courts could blue-pencil restrictive covenants like Alterra's, the 
rule that such covenants are disfavored because they interfere with the fundamental right 
to make a living, and are therefore construed against the drafter, would essentially be 
eviscerated and rendered illusory. Not allowing blue-penciling puts the risk from 
overreaching where it should be: If a company chooses not to draft a covenant restricting 
someone's right to earn a living carefully, and a court concludes it is overbroad, the entire 
covenant should be void. The Court should therefore hold that the trial court erred in 
blue-penciling paragraph 13 of the 2015 Agreement, instead of concluding that all of 
paragraph 13 is void.23 
23 Courts in other states recognize that allowing courts to blue-pencil disfavored 
restrictive covenants would be contrary to the policy reasons for subjecting such 
covenants to heightened judicial scrutiny in the first place. See Lapolla lndust. v. Hess, 
750 S.E.2d 467, 473 (Ga. 2013) (restrictive covenants in employment agreements are 
strictly scrutinized and courts will not blue-pencil them if unenforceable); Gen. Med. 
Corp. v. Kobs, 507 N.W.2d 381, 385 (Wis. 1993) ("'restrictive covenant imposing an 
unreasonable restraint is illegal, void and unenforceable even as to so much of the 
covenant ... as would be a reasonable restraint"' (quoting W.S.A. 103.465) (emphasis by 
court)); Unlimited Opportunity, Inc. v. Waadah, 861 N.W.2d 437 (Neb. 2015) 
(reaffinning that blue-penciling of unenforceable restrictive covenants was not pennitted, 
even if the agreement had a savings clause); Lab. Corp. of Am. Holdings v. Kearns, 2015 
WL 413788 (M.D. N. Car. Jan 30, 2015) ("courts are 'severely' limited in their ability to 
blue-pencil offensive provisions [, and] at most may choose not to enforce a distinctly 
separable part of a covenant in order to render the provision reasonable." (citations 
omitted)); Loewen Group Acquisition Corp. v. Matthews, 12 P.3d 977, 982 (Okla. Ct. 
App. 2000) Gudicial modification of unenforceable restrictive covenant not allowed if 
17 
Alterra contends that Utah law allows blue-penciling (Appellee's Br. at 40), but 
that is based on its misreading of System Concepts. According to Alterra, the Utah 
Supreme Court there revised a restrictive employment covenant "to avoid the 'harsh 
penalty' of rendering the entire covenant void." (Id. (citation omitted).) But the court did 
not revise anything in System Concepts. At issue was whether the plaintiffs failure to 
include an explicit, specific territorial restriction in a covenant not to compete rendered it 
void. Id. at 426-27. The entire market for the plaintiff's products was about 2,500 
potential customers, all in the United States. Instead of imposing the "harsh remedy" of 
voiding the provision "under the particular circumstances" of the small, identifiable 
market, the court found that there was already an implied geographical restriction that did 
not need to be made explicit. Id. at 427. 
The trial court here did not find an implied, additio11al term in the 2015 
Agreement. Instead, it struck as overbroad Alterra's explicit term "future co11tractors," Gt 
based solely on its speculation about what the parties really intended. It is inappropriate 
for a court to speculate when interpreting a contract, and particularly when interpreting a 
disfavored restrictive covenant. Alterra drafted clearly overbroad language, and must 
live with the consequences. 
e. The trial court also erroneously relied on Alterra's facially overbroad 
provision in paragraph 13 of tlte 2015 Agreement tltat bars Mr. Larson from 
interfering in Alterra's business in "any way." (See Appellant's Br. at 31-32.) The 
doing so "would require 'material judicial alteration and the provision of essential tenns <i 
in order to come within the rule of reason"' (citation omitted)). 
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trial court relied heavily on Alterra's "intent" statement in paragraph 13 of the 2015 
Agreement.24 But taken to its logical conclusion, the ''intent" language would entitle 
Alterra to an injunction barring Mr. Larson from leaving Alterra, which might interfere 
with Alterra's business, despite the 13th Amendment. (Appellant's Br. at 31-32.) Even 
if paragraph 13 were not a restrictive covenant that interferes with Mr. Larson's right to 
earn a living, the "intent" language would be overbroad. But since paragraph 13 is such a 
restrictive covenant, the trial court erred in granting the preliminary injunction, and 
instead should have voided paragraph 13. 
Because Alterra cannot dispute that the tenn "interfering in any way" is facially 
overbroad, it baldly asserts: 
The 2015 Agreement's statement that the parties desire that Larson refrain 
from interfering in Alterra's business is a statement of intent, intended to 
assist in interpreting the Agreement, and is not a covenant. Parties may 
include a broad statement of intent to assist in interpretation without 
making the contract void for overbreadth. 
(Appellee's Br. at 41.) "The parties," however, did not draft paragraph 13, Alterra did. 
And because paragraph 13 is composed of disfavored restrictive covenants, it is 
construed against Alterra. The purpose of contract interpretation is to determine intent 
and, when a tenn is unambiguous, "'the parties' intentions are determined from the plain 
meaning' of the words the parties used to describe their agreement." E & H Land, 2014 
UT App 237, at, 13 (citation omitted). Alterra's unambiguous, stated intent is that it 
may bar Mr. Larson from interfering in its "business in any way." But that makes 
24 More accurately, the trial court relied heavily on the language in that sentence except 
for "this Non-Solicitation & Covenant not to Compete Agreement." (See§ II.A.i.3.c.) 
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paragraph 13 facially overbroad on its face, and it is therefore unenforceable. 
Furthermore, because the purpose of contract interpretation is to determine intent, an 
unambiguous "broad statement of intent" by definition states the interpretation. 
Finally, even if Alterra included its "broad statement of intent" to aid in 
interpreting the 2015 Agreement, Alterra does not and cannot explain how its statement 
could be of any aid in interpreting the 2015 Agreement. Alterra does not-and cannot-
explain, for example, why its "broad statement of intent" could change the plain meaning 
of the language in subparagraph 13(ii) that provides that Mr. Larson is only barred from 
recruiting for a company that "provide[s] services of the type offered by Alterra," i.e., 
pest control services. Alterra' s "broad statement of intent" cannot be interpreted such 
that the trial court could ignore "services of the type" and otherwise rewrite paragraph 13 
carte blanche. 
• 
In sum, Alterra did not meet the "likelihood" prong on its breach of contract claim. <.I 
ii. Alterra Did Not Show "Likelihood" on Its UTSA Claim. 
The trial court also erroneously concluded that Alterra showed "likelihood" on its 
UTSA claim. That conclusion was based on its conclusion that "parties can define trade 
secrets, pursuant to legislature's statement in the Trade Secrets Act that the parties may 
agree to define trade secrets in any manner they choose." (R.576 ~ 24.) The trial court 
was simply wrong: The UTSA does define "trade secret," Utah Code section 13-24-2, 
and not/ting in the UTSA provides that parties may choose another definition. 
Alterra argues that whether something is a trade secret is generally a factual issue, 
and that Mr. Larson is appealing the trial court's finding that Alterra's alleged trade 
20 
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secrets are such under the UTSA. (Appellee's Br. at 42-44.) It is true that whether an 
alleged trade secret meets the statutory definition is a factual question. But tlte trial 
court could 11ot ltave determined tltat Alterra's alleged trade secrets meet tlte statutory 
definition it did not know exists. Thus, the trial court also erred in concluding that 
Alterra showed "likelihood" on its UTSA claim. 
B. Irreparable Harm. 
The trial court erred in its perfunctory rulings that Alterra met the "irreparable 
hann" prong, Rule 65A(e)(l). (Appellant's Br. at 35-37.) Alterra needed to show a real 
threat of hann. 25 But instead the trial court's conclusion was based on its improper 
speculation about possible hann to Alterra.26 
Alterra cannot dispute that the trial court's musmgs about what could have 
happened if it did not grant Alterra's preliminary injunction were speculation. Instead it 
<i argues that it showed the misappropriation of trade secrets under the UTSA, so 
irreparable harm is presumed. (Appellee's Br. at 47.) But the trial court only concluded 
that Alterra had shown misappropriation based on its erroneous conclusion that Alterra 
could have defined anytlting as a trade secret under the UTSA. Alterra also argues that 
there was evidence that might support the trial court's speculation. (Id. at 4 7-49.) But 
the trial court's speculation in the Order is just that. Moreover, the trial court's 
25 E.g., Syst. Concepts, 669 P.2d at 428 (injunction only appropriate where 
plaintiff shows "likely or threatened" harm); Schrier v. Univ. of Colo., 427 F.3d 1253, 
1267 (10th Cir.2005) (irreparable injury must be "certain, great, actual; not theoretical"). 
26 E.g., R.574 1 35 (speculating Alterra "could lose significant summer sales if 
Defendant did something he agreed not to do"). 
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conclusions regarding irreparable harm was based on its erroneous conclusion that 
Alterra's provision in subparagraph 13(ii) of the 2015 Agreement that bars Mr. Larson 8 
only from soliciting its salespeople for a company that "provide[ s] services of the type 
offered by Alterra"-pest-control services-also bars him from recruiting for a company 
that sells security systems. The trial court's ruling was also based on its erroneous 
conclusion that Alterra's disfavored restrictive covenants are enforceable, which they are 
not, as discussed in detail above. 
C. Balance of Harms. 
The trial court also erroneously concluded that the balance of equities favored 
Alterra under Rule 65A(e)(2), again based on its improper speculation. (Appellant's Br. 
at 37-39.) Alterra argues that "[r]ather than marshal the evidence ... , [Mr. Larson] 
incorporates the legal arguments presented earlier in his brief." (Appellee's Br. at 49.) 
But Alterra recognizes in that statement that, its repeated contention to the contrary • 
notwithstanding, Mr. Larson is appealing the trial court's legal conclusions. 
Alterra also argues that balancing the equities "is a fact intensive inquiry," and 
lists what it asserts is "substantial evidence of the harm it would [have] suffer[ed]." (Id. at 
50.) But Alterra does not connect this "substantial evidence" to the trial court's 
conclusions regarding hann in the Order. Alterra is thus asking the Court to rule that the 
trial court could have found that the balance of banns favored Alterra, if it had properly 
applied the law. But the trial court's errors are why Mr. Larson is appealing. 
22 
D. Public Interest. 
The trial court erred in concluding that Alterra showed it met the public interest 
prong, Rule 65A(e)(3). The trial court cited Utah's "clear preference for enforcing 
contractual covenants." (R.577 ,r 19.) It is a truism that enforcing contracts is important 
'i generally. But the trial court ignored the competing policy: Restrictive covenants that 
interfere with the right to earn a living are disfavored. The trial court also concluded that 
public policy would not rule out a preliminary injunction "because there is no non-
compete clause at issue." (Id. ,r 20.) But there is a non-compete clause at issue, and even 
if there were not, covenants not to solicit that interfere with the right to make a living are 
equally disfavored with covenants not to compete. (§ II.A.i.3.c.) 
Alterra baldly asserts that "Larson waived his public interest argument by not 
presenting reasoned argument supported by facts and case law." (Appellee's Br. at 51.) 
(® But that is again based on Alterra's mischaracterization of Mr. Larson's appeal. The trial 
court could not have balanced the competing policies when it ignored one of them. 
CONCLUSION 
For the reasons cited herein and in Mr. Larson's opening brief, the trial court erred 
in granting Alterra its preliminary injunction. Accordingly, the Court should reverse the 
trial court's grant of the preliminary injunction. 
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